Abstract: QoS applications rely on accurate detection of protocols in order to effectively manage traffic passing across networks. Peer-to-peer developers already use encryption and network overlays to bypass ISP traffic shaping but their methods only obfuscate telltale signatures. Unidentifiable or encrypted traffic can still be classified as such and therefore can still be managed. The author addresses the feasibility of using protocol mimicry to invoke deliberate false positives in order to bypass existing traffic analysis systems by masquerading as web browsing and VoIP traffic. Statistical analysis is undertaken to determine the costs associated with such modifications. It is found that peer-to-peer protocols can easily be modified to be incorrectly identified as genuine web and voice traffic without impractical increases in bandwidth consumption. The incorrect classification of such traffic can cause havoc with regard to priority-based queuing mechanisms, whereas allowing users to use throttled applications without restrictions. It is certainly feasible for file-sharing protocols such as BitTorrent being further developed to mimic the traits of less throttled protocols to bypass traffic shaping. This poses a huge risk to future ISP and corporate traffic management.
Introduction
The rise in the uptake of internet peer-to-peer file-sharing applications has resulted in a 'tug of war' between ISPs and file-sharing application developers. In order to reduce the resources consumed by bandwidth heavy applications, ISPs use traffic analysis applications to identify, classify and throttle internet traffic based on its application type. However, in order to bypass application specific discrimination by ISPs, developers are constantly looking for new ways to bypass the controls ISPs put in place. In the past this has been done by changing port numbers and encrypting payloads and headers but it is possible that in future they may move onto other, more effective and damaging methods. This paper identifies how existing traffic shaping technologies correctly classify peer-to-peer file-sharing traffic and determines that it is feasible for application developers to redesign file-sharing protocols to circumvent traffic analysis systems by mimicking the traits of others. BitTorrent is used as an example peer-to-peer protocol as it is one of the most widely used today. Although others have looked at using encryption and network overlays to disguise the BitTorrent file-sharing protocol [1 -8] , no one has, until now, attempted to bypass traffic analysis systems by using deliberate false positives in detection instead of preventing classification through obfuscation.
The BitTorrent, HTTP, HTTPS, session initiation protocol (SIP), real-time transfer protocol (RTP) and real-time transfer control protocol (RTCP) protocols are analysed to determine their uniquely identifying traits, signatures and transmission patterns and then BitTorrent's signatures are replaced with those found for web and VoIP traffic. The modified protocols are then tested against real-world analysis tools. Statistical analysis shows that a combination of HTTP and HTTPS has the lowest overall increase in bandwidth usage.
Existing traffic shaping technologies
In order for ISPs to manage traffic travelling through their networks, they must first be able to accurately identify and classify traffic into different application types. Modern traffic analysis systems used by ISPs passively inspect individual packets looking for unique signatures or traits to determine the type of internet application they belong to [9] . Once traffic has been classified, it is possible to actively manage the bandwidth given to each application in order to provide the best quality of service to those of the greatest importance whereas simultaneously minimising congestion caused by bandwidth heavy or low-priority applications [10] .
Deep packet inspection checks packets for common TCP/ UDP port numbers to identify known applications running over default ports. By examining the port numbers of each packet, data transmitted between hosts can be categorised into separate application data streams with each stream managed on an individual basis [11] . Different applications can be given higher priority even when being transmitted between the same source and destination addresses. For non-standard ports, the payload of each packet can be checked for signatures (bit patterns) associated with known protocols in order to define the application.
Application developers for many file-sharing applications, including BitTorrent, have added the ability to encrypt messages between peers [1 -8] thus removing any possibility of detecting payload signatures. When combined with non-standard port numbers encrypted file sharing is very hard to detect. However, obfuscated packets can still be classified as unknown protocol types and therefore can still be managed [6] .
Common implementations of deep packet inspection do not validate the contents of specific protocol packets. Although some [12] have developed methods of using deep packet inspection to validate HTTP message structures by analysing HTTP headers, it only identifies rogue applications using port 80 for non-HTTP traffic and is unable to detect information being hidden within valid HTTP requests. As long as each packet follows the HTTP standard for message structure and receives what looks like a valid HTTP response then the message payload variables can be anything. By exploiting this flaw in traffic classification it is possible to apply stenographic techniques to hide one protocol's data within another while gaining all of the queuing priorities and bandwidth reservations of the mimicked protocol.
Connection analysis ignores layer 4 headers and application payloads and focuses on the network, data link and physical layers of the OSI stack. IP addresses, packet sizes, transmission frequency and upload-to-download ratios are analysed to determine the application type and connection model with a high level of accuracy. Other research [13, 14] has identified further ways of differentiating peer-to-peer communications from the client-server model based purely on the lower three layers. It is, however, just as vulnerable to detection avoidance as deep packet inspection. By altering the ways peer-to-peer clients communicate to closer match the client server model and by using the transmission patterns of other protocols it is possible to again invoke false positives in connection analysis tools.
3 Identification of BitTorrent, web and VoIP traffic
BitTorrent detection
BitTorrent can be detected through both packet inspection and connection analysis. By default, BitTorrent runs on TCP and UDP ports 6881 -6999. By checking packet headers for these values BitTorrent traffic can be easily identified. Deep packet inspection may examine packet payloads for known BitTorrent signatures and classifies traffic as such upon a positive match. Two types of message structures are used in BitTorrent: handshaking messages to establish connections between peers (Fig. 1a) and transfer control messages to keep connections alive and negotiate tit-for-tat file transfers (Fig. 1b) . Every handshake message begins with the same 20 bytes forming a 'magic number' that identifies the protocol to other clients. This bit string is a perfect signature for detecting BitTorrent connections as they are established. Transfer control messages (Fig. 1b) always begin with 4 bytes describing the message length followed by 1 byte with the message ID. Although not as obvious a signature as the handshake bit pattern, it is still very commonly used in peer-to-peer protocols as a whole and is a clear indicator of use.
Finally, BitTorrent can be readily detected by connection analysis as a generic peer-to-peer file-sharing protocol as it has all the typical characteristics such as constant, bi-directional, high bandwidth data throughput and mesh connection patterns. There is very little burst, request 2 response messages between peers.
Identification of web and VoIP traffic
Standard web browsing is identified by its signature of HTTP request 2 response messages over TCP/UDP ports 80, 8008, 8080 and 8090. Each request message contains a method identifier such as 'GET' or 'POST' followed by a uniform resource identifier [15] . For connection analysis, the requestresponse mechanism of HTTP means that a client uploads a small resource request then waits for a larger response. Additional requests are then made for resources referenced within the body of the response. It does not continue to upload data continuously in the way that peer-to-peer applications do. This creates a pattern that vastly differs from the constant uploading and/or downloading associated with file sharing. HTTPS is simply the use HTTP over a TLS/SSL encrypted connection, typically over port 443 [16] .
Common VoIP implementations use three different protocols, each running on a different port number to communicate between clients. These are: SIP to set up and tear down connections [17], RTP [18] for bulk data transfer and RTCP to manage the data stream. Each of these protocols (with the exception of SIP's address resolution mechanism) operate as peer-to-peer communications making them ideal for protocol spoofing in file-sharing applications.
SIP uses HTTP style messages over TCP/UDP ports 5060/ 5061 for open and secure connections, respectively, whereas RTP and RTCP transmit over adjacent UDP ports. RTCP has its own message format to which application specific data can be appended. This creates a unique signature which can be detected by packet inspection. RTP is used to handle the bulk of data transmission between clients and produces data packets of fixed size and transmission frequency depending on the audio codec in use. The payload contents of RTP packets can be difficult to analyse as only the first 12 bytes produce a signature which is followed by meaningless noise until reassembled back into audio. Although some audio codec's may have identifiable signatures, highly used applications such as Skype use their own encryption and compressions methods making voice data an unreliable signature. With regard to connection analysis, RTP transmits data at fixed intervals, usually every 10 or 20 ms [19] . Packets are always of the same size and upload-todownload ratios are usually equal.
Design and testing of modified protocol
Three new BitTorrent implementations were designed and tested, first for technical proof of concept and then for 
Design 1: HTTP
By keeping all transmitted data unencrypted it is possible to avoid ISP throttling of encrypted data. All known signatures associated with BitTorrent are removed. HTTP Post messages are used to transmit BitTorrent control messages as text within POST data and GET requests take care of bulk data transfer.
Design 2: HTTP and HTTPS
The SSL tunnel on port 443 is reserved for transmitting protocol control data only with messages grouped together into one packet to match the usual protocol packet sizes. Bulk data transfer is done over HTTP Get requests as with the previous design. This method minimises the number of messages transmitted and reduces overall protocol overhead while maintaining the transfer patterns of HTTP.
Design 3: VoIP emulation
The SIP message format allows for custom data to be attached to the end of its messages and its position at the beginning of a voice call is ideal for BitTorrent handshaking. SIP messages must follow a specific sequence between clients (Fig. 2) which is well suited for establishing BitTorrent connections. Transfer control messages are embedded within RTCP senders reports (Fig. 3) with the message ID and other data embedded in variable fields. RTP is used for bulk data transfer as organised with the RTCP messages. Download only without uploading can be achieved by sending RTCP recipient reports in place of senders reports, minimising bandwidth usage whereas still maintaining a valid VoIP connection signature.
Testing and results
A control and variable method of testing was used. Each of the original and three modified implementations were tested against Wireshark's packet capture and analysis, Cisco's NBAR and a domestic deep packet inspection firewall. The original BitTorrent client was correctly identified as BitTorrent or a generic peer-to-peer file-sharing protocol and the modified versions were detected as web and VoIP traffic in all cases.
Statistical analysis
To determine the increase in bandwidth associated with each of the modified protocols, packet captures were performed for on the original BitTorrent client in two environments: a controlled lab of three hosts and a real-world test on the global internet from a swarm of 850 other hosts of various completion states. Both tests completely downloaded the same file of 6MB from 0% completion. The results show that the combination of HTTP and HTTPS has the lowest increase in total data transfer which could be reduced even further with further development. Although the VoIP implementation is ideal for peer-to-peer file sharing because of peer-to-peer connection patterns, it has a very high bandwidth increase because of the increased protocol overhead which will need significant further development to reduce. The figures also assume that VoIP transfers are one directional at any one time as the BitTorrent protocol does not require downloading to upload and vice versa. Like-for-like transfers will reduce this figure.
Evaluation of findings
The results analysed meet only the minimum requirements of the HTTP specification and most web applications include far more information with each request. However, everything that is explicitly required by the official HTTP 1.1 specification [15] is included in the designs and therefore packets should be identified incorrectly as HTTP by any existing production environment traffic analysis tool. With HTTP traffic being the core of the web as we currently know it, this could have a serious effect on internet traffic as legitimate and spoofed HTTP transfers will become indistinguishable. Fortunately, unlike the VoIP implementation, HTTP-based implementations are not very effective at disguising the mesh like connection patterns of peer-to-peer file sharing and will suffer from unusually high upload rates which can be used to identify problematic customers during prolonged usage.
Conclusion and future work
This paper has identified that existing traffic shaping methods are vulnerable to bypassing by deliberately invoking false positives of other protocols such as HTTP and SIP/RTCP/ RTP. This vulnerability also has the potential for raising the priority of bulk transfer traffic in priority-based queuing systems that give precedence to RTP packets. It is also an effective way to bypass protocol filtering without encryption and has a potential for denial of service attacks across VoIP networks. Further work is required to create a real-world, fully functional implementation of the modified protocol designs for testing on the global internet against stronger, more reliable and cutting edge, real-time traffic analysis tools.
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